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Abstract: 
Congestion costs are emerging as one of the most important challenges faced by 
metropolitan planners and transport authorities in first world economies. In US 
these costs were as high as 78 million dollars in 2005 and are growing due to 
fast increases in travel delays.  In order to solve the current and severe levels of 
congestion the US department of transportation have recently started a program 
to initiate congestion pricing in five metropolitan areas. In this context it is 
important to determine those factors helping its implementation and success, but 
also the problems or difficulties associated with charging projects. In this article 
we analyze worldwide experiences with urban road charging in order to extract 
interesting and helpful lessons for policy makers engaged in congestion pricing 
projects and for those interested in the introduction of traffic management tools 
to regulate the entrance to big cities.  
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I. Introduction
Congestion costs are emerging as one of the most important challenges faced by metropolitan 
planners and local public authorities in first world economies. In the US, these costs raised to 
$78 million in 2005 implying important economic loses for individuals and for the national 
economy, caused by delays and excess fuel consumption. If we add environmental concerns 
to these economic costs the issue becomes even more severe. In table 1 we display some data 
on the costs derived from congestion for U.S. urban areas. As is shown, congestion supposed 
less than 15 billion of dollars (in terms of 2005) in 1982, and today represents almost 80 
billion. Only in one year congestion costs grew more than 7% between 2004 and 2005, 
leading to severe concerns for local policy makers and transportation authorities. 
(insert table 1 around here) 
The traditional solution to congestion costs have been infrastructure enlargement and road 
investments. However, Langer and Winston (2007) recently showed how ineffective is US 
government spending devoted to lower congestion costs by these means. Their estimates 
suggest that each dollar spent in highways only reduces road users congestion costs by 11 
cents. Their conclusion is that there must be a change in the approach to reducing congestion 
costs pointing out that unlike spending, road pricing produces benefits without using public 
financial resources. Also, by comparison, Parry (2002) finds the existence of stronger 
efficiency gains derived from congestion taxes over other alternative policies.  
Fighting urban congestion costs has become an important issue in the agenda of 
transportation policy making in the U.S. (Geddes, 2007). In this direction, in August 2007, 
U.S. Transportation Department selected five metropolitan areas among 26 candidates in 
order to start a nationwide initiative to fight congestion costs by giving subsidies ($848.1 
million) that help in the implementation of congestion pricing projects and other traffic 
management tools. The cities chosen were New York ($354.5 million), Miami ($62.9 
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million), Minneapolis ($133.3 million), San Francisco ($158 million) and Seattle ($138.7 
million); some of them are placed in the highest positions in the ranking of congestion costs in 
U.S. displayed in table 2.  
(insert table 2 around here) 
In this article we review international experiences on urban congestion charges in order to 
extract lessons and facts that can provide interesting recommendations and advice to those 
public authorities actually engaged in congestion pricing projects or those willing to follow 
the initiatives of successful cities like Singapore, London or Stockholm in order to reduce 
peak-time traffic in their city centers. Also, in the current US context, this worldwide 
experiences can help in the determination of those factors driving success of failure in the 
implementation of urban road pricing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, some introductory theoretical 
background is provided in order to understand what is meant by congestion charging and 
traffic demand in the first section. In the second we review several international and 
successful experiences with urban congestion charging (and one failure experience)  in order 
to extract general lessons. These lessons for policy makers are placed in the last section of the 
current article.  
II. Theoretical background 
The seminal works by Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) founded the theoretical background 
necessary to understand congestion charging, and the pioner articles by Walters (1961) and 
Vickrey (1963) set the basis of the instruments to conduct optimal road pricing using toll 
implementation. The main intuition behind congestion charging is the internalization of 
negative externalities (time costs and delays) which are imposed to other road users by an 
additional driver entering the road. The efficient allocation of traffic is met when the price 
payed by a road user equals the marginal cost generated to the rest of users. As is supposed by 
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congestion pricing in the short run, infrastructure enlargements are not feasible and the 
optimal allocation of traffic must rely on toll collection.    
Formally, the optimal toll achieving the efficient allocation of traffic given a fixed capacity 
is computed following the next equation:  
 
·
sACP OC Q EC
Q

  

 
 
Therefore, the so-called pigouvian toll (P) positively responds to the operational cost (OC) 
of the producer, to the change in the average cost of the Q users (AC) by the addition of one 
more vehicle, and to other externalities produced by the use of the road (EC). In this simple 
framework we assume that road use does not impose costs related to pollution, noise or 
accidents to the society (EC=0), in order to focuse the analysis in the congestion problem 
what is the main objective of urban road pricing projects implemented in the world.  
As a result, the additional driver must pay for the costs imposed to the infrastructure which 
are normally close to zero, except for heavy vehicles, and for the marginal increase in the 
average costs of the whole group of drivers in the road. The rational of this charge implies 
that the toll increases with congestion levels since the cost suffered by users is increasing with 
the quantity of vehicles (Q). On the contrary, when low traffic flows are in place average 
social costs tends to the costs incurred by the new driver. Thus, specially when the vehicle is 
light and operational costs can be assumed to be zero, the toll decreases and becomes 0 when 
no congestion level is reached. The private cost for a new driver remains constant for any Q < 
Qc , what means that every additional road user faces the same cost while the number of 
vehicles in the road is lower than the congestion volume Qc. Otherwize, for any Q > Qc the 
private cost suffered by the additional driver increases with the number of vehicles in the road 
but does not internalize the costs that are suffering the vehicles already in the road. Thus, the 
cost which represents for the driver to enter the road is smaller than the marginal cost imposed 
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to the rest of drivers ( MCp < MCs).  The difference between marginal private costs and 
marginal social costs grows with Q. 
Under this situation, when Q > Qc the level of traffic is higher than the optimal volume 
since additional drivers are not internalizing the costs produced to the rest of drivers. The 
solution which leads to the optimal volume is to increase the private costs of entering the road 
with the marginal costs that this decision would generate to the rest of vehicles. This 
difference between social and private marginal costs for each Q is exactly the optimal toll (Ps) 
needed to internalize congestion costs. Therefore the level of the optimal toll must vary with 
congestion levels and vehicle type (if different vehicles differently affect infrastructure costs). 
This concept is known as Pigouvian taxation and has remained the leading principle in 
transport economics on road traffic externalities regulation (Button and Verhoef, 1998) 
(insert figure 1 around here)  
III. Worldwide Experiences on Congestion Charging 
In this section we provide a review of the most important experiences in road charging 
implementation in the world in order to distinguish the common features of these experiences 
and the possible implications for the US cities. This overview pays especial attention to the 
forms and results of congestion charging projects, but also takes into account the importance 
of the political issues concerning this challenge for local governements. Most of the section is 
devoted to describe and analyze the successful experiences of London, Singapore, Stockholm 
and the Norwegian cities, but the failure of Edinbourgh is also considered in the last part of 
the section as a good example of the problems that may face the local authority when 
implementing the measure.  
1. Successful experiences 
London
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The London congestion pricing was the first important experience and the best known success 
in reducing congestion costs in European big cities. Since February 2003 it is necessary to pay 
a fee (neither time-varying nor vehicle-varying) in order to enter the city center during 
weekdays between 7:00am and 6.30pm, with the exception of motorcycles, public transport 
vehicles and other particular vehicles like those for disabled people or emergency vehicles.1 
Once the charge is payed it includes unlimited  journeys into and around the restricted area. 
The people living in the city center are almost exempted as well, since they receive high 
discounts. The area charged has recently been extended in 2007, the price has increased from 
5£ to 8£ in three years (July 2005) and is expected to rise until 10£ by the end of 2008. 
As a result, right after the implementation private vehicles declined between 15% and 20% 
in two weeks – 30% in the long run - and significant increases were found in bus use. In fact, 
according to Transport for London reports, 50% of car reductions were transfers to public 
transportation, 25% were diverted around the charging cordon, 10% decided to use other 
private modes like taxi, motorbikes or bicycles and the rest decided to avoid trips or shifted 
the trip to non-charging hours. Traffic speed improved within the restricted area achieving a 
37% increase and delays during peak time dropped about 30% for private vehicles and 50% 
for buses. In order to compensate this demand increase, Transport for London increased the 
number of available buses with 300 new vehicles. Regarding environmental impacts, the 
project achieved significant reductions in greenhouse gases emissions. For instance, CO2 
emissions declined in the charging zone by 16%. 
As a matter of fact, the congestion charge influenced the decisions of road users on whether 
to take a trip, the mode used and the time of the day chosen, but also produced a virtuous 
circle for bus tranportation according to Leape (2006). This virtuous circle is based on the 
                                                 
1 The use of a flat charge for the whole period makes sense in the London case since average speeds 
were similar during the charging period (Leape, 2006). 
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idea that less congestion increases bus average speed, which at the same time enjoy more 
passengers and as a result more revenues to improve the system are raised (Small, 2005). 
The origin of the measure comes from the political restructuration in the area of London in 
2000, when Ken Livingstone (Labour Party) won the elections becoming the new Mayor of 
the area of London (Greater London Authority) with a platform that included congestion 
pricing implementation (Litman, 2006). National government (Labour) also supported the 
Mayor’s plan and public consultations reported enough public support to engage the project 
thanks to the severity of congestion in the city center. On the contrary, the Conservative Party 
promised the end of the program, receiving support from some labour organizations and 
motorist clubs. In fact, the City of Westminster council, which was the local authority ruled 
by conservatives and responsible for governing the borough restricted by the system, was the 
most difficult obstacle faced, since it challenged the project on the basis that it was unlawful 
and would produce even more pollution (Banister, 2003). The British High Court rejected that 
claim. 
Nonethless, after some years of implementation the system enjoys popular support and the 
political opposition is not questioning congestion pricing anymore. In this direction, some 
business groups also support the system because its costs are offset by its benefits (lower 
delivery time, employees arriving on time, etc.). Moreover, for most workers in the area the 
fee represents a really small amount if we take into account the high wages payed in Central 
London. In this sense, for those working in the restricted area the time advantage can 
compensate its payment. However, smaller retailers still blame the scheme probably due to 
political ideology since their relationship with the Mayor has been usually unconfortable, and 
also may represent a political strategy to gain special treatment (Litman, 2006). However, 
Quddus, Carmel and Bell (2007) found that congestion charging did not affect overall retail 
sales in Central London, but some concrete stores could suffer some sale reductions. Indeed, a 
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survey of 500 firms found in 2004 that 72% recognize the effectiveness of congestion charge 
(Clark, 2004). Transport for London (2005) reports that the scheme was neutral for business 
as well. 
As in other cases, revenues raised thanks to congestion charges are used to fund public 
transportation investments (80% of total net revenues), but the electronic camera recording 
system used in the city is quite expensive and a substantial amount is devoted to cover this 
operational costs. In fact, these costs were higher than expected and net annual revenues were 
finally half of the expected. Leape (2006) justifies the low net revenue due to the success of 
the plan in reducing car use, the expensive implementation costs and the extended discounts 
awarded to several groups of citizens. However, increasing fees overtime cause an increase in 
revenues that reduces the relative weight of the operational costs. According to Banister 
(2003) the main beneficiaries from congestion charging are assumed to be commercial 
vehicles and those still using private cars and enjoying substantial time decreases, but also 
those who were already using public transportation due to new public investements funded 
from charging revenues. Road accidents savings are also considered as a gain related to the 
implementation of the measure and 11% of revenues was also devoted to improve road safety. 
To conclude, according to Santos and Fraser (2006) the London congestion charging 
constitutes an economic and political success due to several reasons. First, it took into 
consideration the public opinion but avoid the use of referendums to take the decision of 
implementing the measure – it is not clear the support it would have enjoyed -. Second, a 
cost-benefit analysis was carried out and also took into account distributional effects. And 
finally, it was specifically  planned for the characteristics of Central London. 
Singapore
The experience of Singapore is also well known for its unique lenght and its success in 
managing traffic according to efficient allocations by using road charges which varies by the 
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time of the day (Olszewski and Xie, 2005). Therefore, the objective of the measure was to 
manage traffic allocations instead of collecting money and remained as the unique full-scale 
urban road pricing scheme designed to reduce peak-time traffic in the world for a long time 
(Olszewski, 2007). Congestion pricing was introduced in Singapore in 1975 when authorities 
decided to use an Area Licensing Scheme in the center of the city. Later, in 1998, after its 
successful results from this pricing strategy, they decided to upgrade the system by using 
electronic road pricing. Charges are payed in the central area between 7:30 am – 7:30 pm in 
the weekdays, but those entering from 10:00am to 12:00 are exempted. On the other hand, in 
other radial arterial roads charges are only payed between 7:30am – 9:30am. As was 
mentioned, tolls vary depending on time but also by vehicle. Olszewski (2007) details how 
the price varies: 
 From 7:30am to 8:00am: $1.50 
 From 8:00am to 8:30am: $2.00 
 From 8:30am to 9:00am: $3.00 
 From 9:00am to 9:30am: $1.00 
 
Congestion cuts were achieved right after the introduction of the Area Licensing Scheme. 
The traffic was reduced by more than 40% in the restricted area and thanks to the electronic 
system it was additionally reduced another 15% during the peak time. However, increases of 
10% were found during the rest of time slots. Therefore, time shifts are found in traffic 
congestion due to road pricing. In addition, authorities realized that after the introduction of 
electronic road pricing, drivers were using alternative roads  and other periods of time 
(Christainsen, 2006; p.80). In fact, after urban charging introduction the share of private cars 
over total commuters declined from 48% to 29% (Watson and Holland, 1978). 
Estimates on the elasticity of demand respect fee levels are established in -0.21 in the short 
run and in -0.30 in the long run, being the elasticity in the long run a 42% higher than the one 
in the short run (Olszewski, 2007). Also, public transportation received the benefits from the 
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measure by increasing its average speed making of buses a good choice and consequently 
increasing trip profitability with the additional demand. Indeed, its use increased about 20%. 
Stockholm
Congestion pricing was permanently introduced in the City of Stockholm in August 2007, but 
a period trial was undertook from January 2006 until July 2006.2 Charges are placed in the 
entrance of the city center in the form of two cordon lines where vehicles are charged every 
time they cross – though some classes of vehicles are exempt of payment-. The fee changes 
depending on the time of the day and lays between $1.50-3 in the rush hours in the weekdays. 
No congestion charging applies in the weekend.  
The main purpose of the measure was reducing congestion, increasing accessibility and 
improving the environment, but secondary objectives were more precisely established: 
 Reduce traffic volumes on the busiest roads by 10-15%.  
 Improve the flow of traffic on streets and roads.  
 Reduce emissions of pollutants harmful to human health. 
 Improve the urban environment as perceived by Stockholm residents. 
 Provide more resources for public transport. 
 Better road safety outcomes.  
 
The direct cost of that implementation raised to 3,8 billion SEK and the public 
transportation was improved by adding 197 new buses, 16 new buslines from the metropolitan 
area of Stockholm into the inner city and the reinforcement of the existing underground and 
commuter train lines. Also, more park-and-ride facilities were provided. 
 As happened in some cities, a referendum on the permanent implementation of congestion 
charging was carried out on September 2006. In the city of Stockholm 51,3% of citizens 
supported the project, while 45,5% voted against. The rest were blank or invalid votes. 
However, the rest of municipalities in the county surrounding the city of Stockholm refuted 
                                                 
2 In fact the trial started on August 2005 with extended public transport but congestion charges were 
not implemented until January 2006. 
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the implementation of this measure – 39% supported the project and 60% voted against- 
though the Social Democratic party in office announced that only results given in the city of 
Stockholm were going to be considered. On the contrary, the conservative opposition – 
Alliance for Sweden - announced in the campaign that their decision would take into 
consideration the rest of municipalities as well if they win the general elections organized the 
same day of this referendum.  In fact, only one party in the coalition was clearly in favor of 
the measure. A summary on referendum results is displayed in table 3. Results adding votes 
from the city of Stockholm and the rest of municipalities reported a slight rejection of the 
project – 53% No votes vs. 47.5% Yes votes-. 
(insert table 3 around here) 
One possible reason of this political controversial may arise by the institutional power 
enjoyed by both parties in the county of Stockholm. The Social Democratic Party was ruling 
the city of Stockholm as the main party in the governing coalition, while the conservative 
coalition has a strong presence in the councils from the surrounding municipalities.  In fact, in 
11 out of the 14 of these municipalities where the referendum took place, the conservative 
coalition was the traditional municipal government enjoying a wide majority. 
In table 4 we provide, by showing correlations, some preliminary evidence on the 
relationship between the share of votes in the municipal elections for both leading parties in 
the two coalitions, and the share of votes supporting the implementation of congestion 
charging. As is shown, there is a positive correlation between the presence of Social 
Democratic voters in those municipalities and the share of YES votes. The opposite 
relationship can be identified for the Moderate Party though this is weaker.   
(insert table 4 around here) 
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Indeed, the reason behind the Moderate Party’s commitment to consider all municipalities 
was probably its institutional presence in these councils. To capture this we provide OLS 
estimates for the following simple regression model: 
 
Yesi =  +  Share Partyi+ i 
 
where we use as dependent variable the share of YES votes in the referendum in each 
municipality i, and as unique regressor the share of votes for both parties. A constant and 
random mean zero error terms are also included. The share of party votes used in this 
regression are the votes related to previous municipal elections (2002) in municipality i, in 
order to identify the institutional presence of each parties before the referendum. By this 
strategy we can distinguish the effect of those cities where each party enjoyed more support in 
order to explain the share of YES votes. 
(insert table 5 around here) 
As is shown, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the 
presence of Social Democratic voters and the share of YES votes. This means that in those 
municipalities where Social Democratic Party was in office or had an important presence, the 
YES option enjoyed more support than in places where this party was residual. On the 
contrary, the insitutional presence of conservatives is negative and statistically significant as 
well. Therefore, where the conservatives enjoyed a wide popular support the NO option was 
chosen the most.   
The most interesting point is what happened after elections. National elections were won by 
the conservative coalition and a new majority arouse in the Parliament. After some months, 
the new government decided to re-start congestion pricing even having commited to consider 
the whole county results on the referendum. One political explanation is that they also won 
the municipal elections in the city of Stockholm, the capital and the most important council in 
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the country, which can be considered a switching district. On the other hand, the rest of the 
county was traditionally conservative and their majority was consolidated and not threaten in 
most municipalities. The measure was approved on June 2007.  
In spite of its approval, several changes were decided on the use of the revenue obtained. 
Although these funds were devoted to public transport during the trial stage under Social 
Democratic government, in the permanent setting of the project the new government decided 
to use the revenue to invest in infrastructure enlargements rather than in public transport. 
Moreover, this investments were going to be devoted to improve the outer rings of the city, 
probably to compensate the outer voters from the decision taken contrary to the promise 
made. 
Results of the measure are more than satisfying if we consider the expected goals. The 
reduction for the entire congestion charge periods over 24 hours was about 19% and this 
decrease in traffic across the cordon was largest during the morning and afternoon rush hours 
– from 6:30 am to 18:00 pm – when passages dropped by 22% on weekdays 
(Stockholmsforsöket 2006, p. 6). Average journey times also fell in the inner-city and the 
queuing times dropped by approximately a third in the morning rush and have been halved in 
the afternoon rush. At the same time, more people – approximately a 6% more than the year 
before - changed of transport mode by leaving private cars to use public transport, and the 
number of cars in the park-and-ride facilities grew a 23% as well.  
The cases of the island Lidingö, which its only access is the one connecting the island to the 
city center, and also the access by the E4/Essingeleden bypass, provide the counter-part. 
These routes remained free of charge due to the lack of free alternatives and have experienced 
a significant increase of traffic and average travel time.  
Another interesting fact from the Swedish experience is that during the period in which 
public transport was expanded without congestion charges no significant reductions on motor 
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traffic was achieved but this investment is considered necessary in order to make easier to 
switch from private transport to public after the introduction of charges. 
Concerning environmental impacts, the reduction of emissions achieved can be determined 
between 8% and 14% in the inner-city. On the contrary, for Greater Stockholm the reduction 
was lower, placed between the 1% and 3%. Greenhouse gas carbon dioxide also dropped by 
40% in the inner city while in the rest of the area the decrease was a 2-3%. Besides, road 
safety was also improved thanks to the measure and the reduction in the number of accidents 
involving injuries achieved a significant 5-10% in the inner-city meaning the avoidance of 
about 70 of this type accidents. 
Equity effects can also be considered. In fact, it is found that congestion taxes negatively 
affect (Transek, 2006): 
- the inner city more than other areas (they pay twice more than outer residents). 
- high-income individuals more than low-income individuals (they pay three times more). 
- employed people more than others (they pay three times more) 
- households with two adults with children more than other types of households. 
- men more than women (they pay 50% more) 
However, these are the groups which also enjoy the largest time gains.  
Finally, congestion charges only had a minor impact on retail but it is considered too early 
to extract causalities. Sales were developed under the same pattern than before but transport 
business – taxis, couriers and tradespeople – receive the benefits from the improvement in 
accessibility and journey time cuts. 
Norwegian cities (Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim) 
The use of road charging is also used in some Norwegian cities like Bergen, Oslo and 
Trondheim in the form of toll cordons. In Oslo the system is always operating, in Bergen the 
toll is only charged to users between 6am and 10pm on weekdays, and Trondheim decided to 
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charge users from 6am to 5pm. In all cases the toll is not time-varying with the slight 
exception of Trondheim where after 10am the fee is lower, but heavy vehicles pay double. 
However, the motivation behind congestion charging was not to achieve an efficient 
allocation by reducing congestion, but raising money to fund road projects in 1986. The main 
reason that lead the Bergen’s Council to undertake this project was the expected delay of 
national funds to cover infrastructure needs. The project had to finish in 2001.  
This first experience in the country was followed by other important cities like Oslo and 
Trondheim in 1990 and 1991 respectively, which are in turn the first electronic systems of toll 
collection. The same rationale behind Bergen’s plan was established in both cases, which 
should be closed in 15 years (Larsen and Ostmoe, 2001). 
In this experience most of revenues were devoted to invest in road projects. Only small 
amounts were invested in public transport, since the law supporting toll collection restricted 
the use of revenues to invest in road infrastructure. In fact, the only purpose of toll collection 
was to raise money for these projects and according to Larsen and Ostmoe (2001) traffic 
management was never an issue. That is why it is not correct to consider these experiences as 
congestion charging projects and the source of popular opposition. However, fiscal 
constraints in a moment of enlargement and improvement needs justified from a political 
point of view the introduction of such a measure. 
Once the system was implemented the opposition diminished thanks to the obvious effects 
on new infrastructure investments which were very visible for the public. However, one 
interesting aspect of these cases is that the issue was not politically used. Indeed, both main 
national parties agreed the measure and this diminished the electoral risk of the big parties.  
As a result, Norwegian toll cordons were successful in their objective of funding road 
projects but did not consider any traffic management function. In spite of this, a reduction of 
about 10% was found in the peak hours at least in Trondheim. In the Oslo and Bergen no 
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traffic reduction was identified. The popularity of the measure has never been significant but 
the political consensus prevented a failure in the project. Social costs of this measure were not 
considered and there are reasons to doubt whether this is the most efficient way to raise 
money by governments. 
After these successful experiences other cities introduced the same scheme in the country 
(Kristiansand, Satavanger, Tønsberg and Namsos) and prospects of introducing congestion 
charging are possible since the amendment of the Road Act that restricted the use of revenues 
to fund road projects (Santos and Fraser, 2006; p.267) 
2. Failure experiences 
Edinburgh
The city of Edinburgh had been developing a congestion pricing scheme for almost a decade 
when decided to carry out a referendum in February 2005. The scheme proposed was a two 
cordon congestion zones – charged between 7:00-10:00 in the inner cordon and 7:00-18.30 in 
the most extensive one- and the daily fare charged to private transport users would be 2 
pounds. Revenues were going to be devoted to improve public transport. 
  Edinburgh citizens rejected the project in a referendum –74.4 % of negative votes– and the 
council gave up the plan of charging road users. The Councillor Donald Anderson announced 
after the results that “the idea is now dead and buried for Edinburgh but we are as committed 
as ever to further improving our city's transport” (BBC news. 22 February 2005). The result 
also stopped other UK city plans to implement similar congestion charging systems. 
Gaunt, Rye and Allen (2007) sent a survey to voters in order to understand the decision 
process which lead most citizens to reject congestion pricing. Their exploited results show 
that the principal factor for those rejecting the project was car use, but also the public’s 
limited understanding of the scheme increased the strength of the opposing vote. Moreover, 
according to their results, voters were unconvinced that the scheme proposed would have 
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achieved its dual objectives of reducing congestion and improving public transport. The main 
view was that government was trying to collect money from road users thanks to this charge 
as a substitute for tax raises and no impacts were expected in the public transport quality. In 
fact, this was the experience with previous fees and since public transport improvements were 
not initiated, its users considered that the project would shift more people into the public 
network damaging its quality. Following the same rationale, McQuaid and Grieco (2005) also 
consider that reducing congestion was a secondary motive of congestion charging, given the 
high revenue raising component of the project. 
Politically, this issue was also part of the debate between government and opposition and 
probably this also had an impact on referendum results. The Labour Party and their Liberal 
Democrat coalition partners in the Scottish executive were supporting the plan – Labour Party 
was ruling the city of Edinburgh- while opposition parties with the exception of the Green 
Party, defended a negative vote.  
This time the surrounding municipalities like West Lothian, Midlothian and Fife, also 
controlled by the Labour Party – but in some of them the Scottish National Party was really a 
threat -, were against the project and claimed that the project was unfair with those living far 
from the capital. However their political weight was very small in comparison with Edinburgh 
institutions and were not consultated in the referendum.  
Regarding interest groups, those against the project were strongly organized, while the ones 
supporting the measure and more benefited never did so.   
IV. Lessons 
From the experiences presented above, there are interesting lessons that can be obtained to 
help those policy makers engaged in the challenge of implementing congestion charging in 
their cities or to those interested in traffic management tools. These lessons are characterized 
in the present section and are divided in three sub-sections. Firstly, we extract the main 
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lessons from the challenge of making road charging acceptable for the public. Secondly, since 
there is a worry on the distributional effects that the policy may produce, we highlight the 
main aspects which must be considered by policy makers and city planners on this issue and 
finally, general results of the experiences described are summarized at the end. 
1. Making road pricing acceptable.
The main obstacle to the implementation of urban charges is public acceptance and political 
support in cities enjoying well developed mass-transit systems (Glazer and Niskanen 2000; 
Jaensirisak, Wardman and May 2005). These problems on pricing acceptance usually appear 
due to the difficulty in explaining to the public the application of marginal cost pricing in 
order to achieve efficiency goals. In fact too much weight has been put to efficiency criterias 
which are the most difficult to understand and convey for the public (Viegas, 2001). In 
addition, this lack of understanding and confidence from the public shifts fear to politicians 
who also see the pricing solution as politically not acceptable, since citizen preferences are 
major determinants in policy decisions and they turn into alternative ways of controlling car 
use (May and Nash, 1996). 
One important obstacle to achieve user acceptance is the transition from enjoying free 
access onto mandatory payment for the same access. This access is usually considered by the 
public as a right since it is generally assumed that demand for driving is highly price inelastic 
and that road pricing produces unfair effects (Jones, 1998).  
To extract interesting lessons on the importance of public acceptance we can collect the 
experience of Edinburgh which resulted in project rejection due to equity and lack of 
information problems; and to the Norwegian cities in which the public opposed the measure 
without success. On the other hand, better acceptance was found in London, Singapore and 
Stockholm. Probably, the motivation claimed to support urban road pricing, which was the 
need to fund capacity enlargements in the transport system in those cities, especially in the 
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public transportation, was of great help instead of the traffic management argument in the 
cases in which congestion is not as severe as was in London. Raising revenues to improve 
transportation is easier to understand. However, in Norway the fiscal motivation was exactly 
what lead most peaple to react against the project. Indeed, one of the most important aspects 
of a congestion charging project is the use given to revenues and its political accountability. 
In those cases the revenues are used to fund road projects rather to improve local 
transportation, but in the cases of Stockholm and London the resources are devoted to public 
transportations. Probably for this reason the opposition decreased after some time.   
In fact, Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann (2002) argue that the revenues of road 
pricing can also be used to overcome political resistance since policy makers favor 
instruments that weaken the government’s budget constraint and funds can be returned 
through compensations. In fact, in all experiences a large list of discounts are awarded to 
those citizens affected the most. 
Again on the use of revenues, some surveys also point out that the public is more prone to 
support environmental programs rather that traffic management reforms. That is why Jones 
(1998) defends the importance of claiming for other goals instead of raising money. 
Therefore, including these measures into environmental packages may help its acceptance 
(May and Nash, 1996; Oberholzer-Gee and Weck-Hannemann, 2002).  
A clear pattern in most experiences is that opposition against congestion charging 
diminishes after some time. Therefore, trial periods are a good instrument before any 
referendum. The trial, at least in Stockholm, was a key factor in gaining support for the 
measure. Another possibility is to impose congestion charges if there is a political agreement 
that prevents the use of this issue against the goverment, knowing that after some months the 
public will get used to the measure and opposition intensity will be lowered without electoral 
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consequences. In fact, Shade and Shlag (2003) state that this reaction also appears when the 
measure is imminent and the opposition is wasteful. 
2. Equity effects of road charging 
Besides efficiency other objectives are usually pursued by road charging or taken into 
consideration. Environmental goals and equity are normally integrated in the project and can 
help in its motivation and justification. Moreover, these other dimensions are basic aspects in 
the acceptance of road pricing as was previously warned. In fact, Viegas (2001) includes 
equity in the core of acceptability since this is strongly related to the perception of fairness. 
The main problem from the equity point of view is the exclusion from access to a range of 
users not willing to pay the fee established for the use of the road. This range of users is 
usually the low-income group of citizens who are shifted to other public transport modes. 
According to Eliasson and Mattsson (2006) equity effects are important because the 
magnitude of the redistribution can be so large that it dwarfs the net benefit of the project and 
secondly because it can result regressive since high-income groups give higher value to their 
time and may support paying to get time gains (Arnott, de Palma and Lindsey, 1994; Evans, 
1992; ).3 Thus, equity in this frameworks “involves not only equality between mode users and 
between operators, but also the risk of increasing inequalities between users or consumers, 
and the desire to preserve social or spatial solidarity” (Raux and Sauche, 2004, pp 193) 
For this reason it is important to analyze distributional effects and consider the impact of the 
use given to the revenues in order to compare them with the net welfare surplus. May and 
Nash (1996) consider that the net effects are crucially influenced by how the revenue from 
road pricing is used. In this way, Eliasson and Mattsson (2006) consistently find for 
Stockholm that the net impact of the project is decided by how the revenues are spent. If 
revenues are devoted to improve public transport the system might be considered progressive, 
                                                 
3 Eliasson and Mattsson (2006) argue that that this is likely to happen when congestion levels are low 
or demand is relatively inelastic. 
  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                                    Working Papers 2008/01, 27 pages
21
but if funds are devoted to proportional tax cuts the opposite conclusion holds. Also, residents 
and employees in the city centre are the most affected by the charges, and discounts have been 
the general solution to this negative impacts on specific groups of citizens.4 
 Therefore, the use given to the revenue raised by tolls becomes a central aspect on equity 
effects and its perception by the public (Small, 1992). In most experiences this revenue has 
been devoted to fund public transport supply and Viegas (2001) identifies two advantatges 
from this policy. First, it reduces the costs (loss of utility) from mode change and second, it 
favours the low-income group of citizens who are usually the ones using the most public 
transport. In addition, this policy helps in obtaining a wide public support. Banister (2003) 
also concludes that charging revenues must be re-invested in the transport system in order to 
overcome equity concerns favouring the low-income groups of citizens. 
Also, it is important to take into account that according to McQuaid and Grieco (2005) the 
winners from new policies are likely to be less strident than economic losers and this provide 
some fear to policy makers which prefer to avoid the opposition of interest groups (Fietelson 
and Solomon, 2004; Harrington, Krupnick and Alberini, 2001). 
3. General results 
Urban road charging experiences, once implemented, have shown interesting results leading 
to success in the reduction of peak-time traffic. Therefore, they become a successful tool to 
manage demand and decrease congestion  and environmental costs. In the cases of London, 
Stockholm, Singapore and even in the Norwegian cities where the goal was not traffic 
management, this measure provided significant redutions in the congestion costs associated to 
the entrance of city centers, providing revenue to invest in public transportation or road 
projects. Moreover, the measure increased average speeds everywhere, improving private and 
public transport productivity. The revenues helped in order to make more attractive this public 
                                                 
4 Specific results distinguishing gender suggest that men are more affected than women by the reform. 
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transportation which at the same time received more passengers and as a consequence more 
revenues. In fact, modal split is found since a decrease of private cars in favour of public 
transportation is easily achieved. It is also considered that road pricing improve the 
environment in the city since reductions in greenhouse gases are found in all experiences. On 
the other hand, re-routing and the use of other time periods to shift trips are recognized and 
must be considered by the planner. 
The political situation may also play an important role in order to implement the measure as 
we stated in the Swedish, Scottish and British experiences where the opposition used the issue 
against the incumbent government. On the contrary, when big parties agree in the need to use 
prices to restrict traffic, like in the Norwegian cases, the measure is easily introduced in spite 
of public opposition.  
Trial periods are also recommended before any referendum since it is found that opposition 
against the measure declines after its introduction, especially if the revenues collected can 
provide better public transport and it is made visual for the citizens. The experiences of 
Stockholm and Edinburgh in this field are extremely opposite, also was their success. The use 
given to revenues and the fairness or equity considerations are considered crucial to get the 
public oppinion support. 
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TABLES
 
Table 1. Congestion costs in 437 U.S. urban areas (1982-2005) 
 
1982 1995 2004 2005
Change
04/05
Individual Congestion Costs 
(constant 2005 dollars) 
 
$260 
 
$570 
 
$680 
 
$710 
 
4.4% 
National Congestion Costs 
Congestion cost  
(billions of 2005 dollars) 
 
$14.9 
 
$45.4 
 
$73.1 
 
$78.2 
 
7.0% 
National Travel delays  
(billion hours)  
0.8 2.5 4.0 4.2 5% 
Source: Schrank and Lomax (2007). 
 
 
Table 2. Congestion costs ranking in U.S. urban areas. Top 10 areas in 2005.  
Rank Urban Area Congestion costs 
($Million)
Travel Delay 
(1,000 Hours) 
1 Los Angeles-LBch-Santa Ana, CA. 9,325 490,552 
2 New York-Newark, NY-NJ-CT 7,383 384,046 
3 Chicago, IL-IN 3,968 202,835 
4 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 2,747 152,129 
5 Miami, FL 2,730 150,146 
6 Atlanta, GA 2,581 132,296 
7 San Francisco-Oakland, CA 2,414 129,919 
8 Washington, DC-VA-MD 2,331 127,394 
9 Houston, TX 2,225 124,131 
10 Detroit, MI 2,174 115,547 
Source: Schrank and Lomax (2007). 
 
 
Table 3. Referendum results in the city of Stockholm and in the rest of surrounding 
municipalities (2003). 
Municipality YES NO 
Stockholm a 51.3 45.5 
Rest of Municipalities b  39.8 60.2 
a. Blank and invalid votes represents the remaining 3.2% 
b. Blank and invalid votes not available. 
Source: Authors’ 
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Table 4. Correlations between shares of party votes in general 2003 elections and share of YES 
votes in the referendum 
Correlations Yes 
Share Social Democratic Party (2006) 0.56 
Share Moderate Party (2006) -0.23 
   Source: Authors’ 
 
 
Table 5 Ordinal Least Squares estimates. Dependent variable: Share of Yes votes  
Number of observations = 14. 
Party votes as explanatory variable Share of  
Yes votes 
R2
Share Social Democratic Party (2002) 0.3644*** 
(3.77) 
0.50 
Share Moderate Party (2002) -0.3024** 
(-2.28) 
0.30 
Note: ** Significant at 5%, *** at 1% 
   Source: Authors’ 
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FIGURES
Figure 1. Social and private marginal congestion costs. 
